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Putting Tasks to the Test: Human
Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages
David H. Autor, MIT and National Bureau of Economic Research
Michael J. Handel, Northeastern University
Using original, representative survey data, we document that ana-
lytical, routine, and manual job tasks can be measured with high
validity, vary substantially within and between occupations, are
significantly related to workers’ characteristics, and are robustly
predictive of wage differences between occupations and among
workers in the same occupation. We offer a conceptual framework
that makes explicit the causal links between human capital endow-
ments, occupational assignment, job tasks, and wages, which mo-
tivate a Roy model of the allocation of workers to occupations. We
offer two simple tests of the model’s gross predictions for the re-
lationship between tasks andwages, both of which receive qualified
empirical support.
Introduction
Contemporary analysis of the economic value of skill in the labor market
is rooted in Becker’s ð1964Þ human capital model. A central insight of the
Becker framework is that skill can be treated as a durable investment good
that is acquired ði.e., purchasedÞ in part by attending school or engaging in
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on-the-job training. Building from this logic, empirical analysis of themarket
price of skill, starting with Mincer ð1974Þ, uses investment measures, such as
S60 Autor/Handelyears of schooling and experience, as proxies for skill. The human capital
model has been highly successful in explaining both the level of the return to
education and its evolution over time ðGoldin and Katz 2008Þ. This model is
not directly informative about the demand side of the human capital market,
however. In particular, it is silent on what factors determine the skills that
employers demand, why these skills are required, and how these skill re-
quirements have changed over time. To answer these foundational questions
requires a conceptual framework that links the tasks and activities that
workers perform on the job to the skills needed to carry out these activities.
Recent literature attempts to supply this conceptual apparatus by using
a “task framework” to analyze job skill requirements ðAutor, Levy, and
Murnane 2003Þ. The simple idea of this approach is to classify jobs ac-
cording to their core task requirements—that is, the main activities that
workers must accomplish in their work—and then consider the set of for-
mal and informal skills required to carry out these tasks. The task approach
potentially offers a microfoundation for linking the aggregate demand for
skill in the labor market—a primitive in the human capital model—to the
specific skill demands of given job activities.
The task approach has found application in several recent strands of
work. Autor et al. ð2003Þ study the link between evolving technology,
changes in job task requirements, and shifts in the demand for workers
of different levels of education. Their primary hypothesis is that work-
place computerization leads to the automation of a large set of “middle
education” ði.e., high school or some collegeÞ routine cognitive and man-
ual tasks, such as bookkeeping, clerical work, and repetitive production
tasks. Job tasks in these occupations are readily automated because they
follow precise, well-understood procedures or “routines”—that lend them-
selves to codification in computer software. A key implication of the Autor
et al. ð2003Þ hypothesis is that the well-documented hollowing out ðor
“polarization”Þ of the occupational distribution of employment in nu-
merous advanced countries is in part attributable to computerization.
Subsequent work by Autor, Katz, and Kearney ð2006, 2008Þ, Spitz-
Oener ð2006Þ, Bartel, Ichniowski, and Shaw ð2007Þ, Felstead et al. ð2007Þ,
Goos and Manning ð2007Þ, Smith ð2008Þ, Dustmann, Ludsteck, and
Scho¨nberg ð2009Þ, Antonczyk, DeLeire, and Fitzenberger ð2010Þ, Black
and Spitz-Oener ð2010Þ, Gathmann and Scho¨nberg ð2010Þ, Firpo, Fortin,
and Lemieux ð2011Þ, Goos,Manning, and Salomons ð2012Þ, andAutor and
Dorn ðforthcomingÞ, along with many other recent studies too numerous
to list here, have used the “task approach” to explore links between tech-
nological change, changes in task inputs, and shifts in wage structure.1
1 Goos and Manning use the term “polarization” in a 2003 working paper.
Acemoglu ð1999Þ, Goos andManning ð2003, 2007Þ, Autor et al. ð2006, 2008Þ, Spitz-
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Recent work in the immigration literature also employs a task approach.
Papers by Cortes ð2008Þ and Peri and Sparber ð2009Þ compare the job task
Human Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages S61assignments of equally educated native and immigrant workers.2 Several
recent studies consider the effect of international offshoring on US em-
ployment. In these studies, the unit of analysis is job tasks rather than jobs
per se. Antra`s, Garicano, and Rossi-Hansberg ð2006Þ and Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg ð2008Þ develop theoretical models of international off-
shoring built upon the notion that routine job tasks are more suitable for
offshoring than nonroutine job tasks. Empirical papers by Blinder ð2007Þ
and Jensen andKletzer ð2010Þ analyze the task content of US jobs to assess
their potential for international offshoring.
While these examples highlight the potential value of job tasks as an
organizing framework, the task approach faces two significant challenges.
The first is conceptual. Research using the task approach has not to date
made explicit the economic mapping between tasks, which are charac-
teristics of jobs, and human capital, which is a characteristic of workers.
This disjuncture between tasks and human capital is particularly relevant
to the analysis of the wage “returns” to job tasks, as we discuss below.3
The second challenge is measurement. The primary research data sets
used for studying employment and earnings provide rough measures of
workers’ human capital, such as education, potential experience, gender,
race, and place of birth, but essentially no information on their job tasks.
To overcome this limitation, researchers typically impute task require-
Oener ð2006Þ, Smith ð2008Þ, Dustmann et al. ð2009Þ, Goos et al. ð2012Þ , and Autor2 In related work, Black and Spitz-Oener ð2010Þ point to differences between
males and females in job task specialization as a factor contributing to the closing
of the gender gap in the United States and Germany.
3 Heckman and Scheinkman ð1987Þ provide the canonical theoretical treatment
of the pricing of skill “bundles” in the labor market in a setting where workers
cannot unbundle their skills. A general result of their model is that, due to bun-
dling, skills will not generally be uniformly priced across sectors except under
specialized circumstances. Two recent papers that offer explicit links between
humancapital returnsand taskprices areAcemogluandAutor ð2011Þ andFirpoet al.
ð2011Þ. The first offers an assignment framework that characterizes the equilib-
rium assignment of skills to tasks and the determination of wages when different
skill groups differ in their comparative advantage across task categories. The second
considers how a change in task prices affects wage inequality in a static Roy model
setting where returns to tasks are assumed to differ by occupation.
and Dorn ðforthcomingÞ present evidence that employment polarization has oc-
curred during the last two decades in the United Kingdom, United States, and in
14 of 16 Western European countries for which consistent data are available for
1993–2006. Black and Spitz-Oener ð2010Þ consider implications of this phenom-
enon for demand for female labor. Bartel et al. ð2007Þ present plant-level evidence
on the impact of computerization on work organization and productivity in the
valve manufacturing industry. Firpo et al. ð2011Þ explore the degree to which the
polarization of US wages during the 1990s ði.e., the relative growth of earnings at
high and low wage percentilesÞ can be explained by changes in task prices, growth
of offshoring, and changes in labor market institutions.
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ments to person-level observations using data from the US Department
of Labor’s Dictionary of Occupational Titles ðDOTÞ and its successor,
S62 Autor/Handelthe Occupational Information Network ðO*NetÞ. Both data sets offer
representative measures of job requirements in detailed occupation, but
their limitations for task measurement are substantial.4 Most significantly,
both DOT and O*Net provide information on job characteristics only
at the level of occupations, not workers. This makes analysis of within-
occupation heterogeneity in task demands and its relationship to earnings
infeasible.5 We present evidence below both that job tasks differ among
workers within an occupation and that this variation is an important de-
terminant of earnings.
The current paper provides an exploratory effort to confront both of
the limitations above: a lack of conceptual structure for analyzing the
wage “returns” to tasks and a lack of data for analyzing the person-level
relationship between tasks, education, and wages. The first section offers a
simple conceptual framework for interpreting the relationship between
job tasks and wages. We argue that the familiar logic of the Mincerian
wage regression, used to estimate the “return to education,” does not carry
over to estimating the “returns to tasks.” Distinct from durable invest-
ments such as education, job tasks are not fixed worker attributes; work-
ers can modify their task inputs by self-selecting into particular jobs ac-
cording to comparative advantage and reallocate their labor input among
tasks when the market value of tasks changes. These assumptions motivate
the use of a Roy ð1951Þ self-selection framework to analyze the relation-
ship between tasks and wages. We show that a simple, multidimensional
Roy model implies some testable restrictions on the relationship between
“task returns” within and between occupations and that these implica-
tions are distinct from the Mincerian model.6
The second goal of our paper is to explore the value added of task
measurement at the person level for analyzing job content and wage de-
termination. For this analysis, we collected new data on the job activities
of a representative sample of US workers across a variety of task domains,
including cognitive, interpersonal, and physical activities. These data, a
subcomponent of the Princeton Data Improvement Initiative ðPDIIÞ sur-
4 While an earlier generation of scholars criticized the DOT for its subjective,
nonrepresentative, and outmoded measurement of job characteristics ðMiller et al.
1980Þ, the Department of Labor’s substantial investments in the O*Net have
improved this instrument relative to its predecessor ðbut see National Research
Council 2010, 195ff.; and Handel 2013Þ.
5 Another key limitation is that job content measures in these databases are up-
dated infrequently ðtheDOT is no longer updatedÞ, with time lags that differ among
occupations. This makes it difficult to use these tools to track changes in task con-
tent within jobs.
6 Classic works that consider the relationship between education and compar-
ative advantage include Welch ð1970Þ and Willis and Rosen ð1979Þ.
This content downloaded from 18.7.29.240 on Tue, 10 Mar 2015 13:28:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
vey, allow us to assess the extent to which job tasks vary within ðas well
as betweenÞ occupations and to test whether within-occupation variation
Human Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages S63in job tasks is systematically related to workers’ human capital and demo-
graphic characteristics, such as race and gender.
We further assess the value added of self-reported job tasks as predic-
tors of labor market outcomes relative to similar occupation-level mea-
sures available from sources like the O*Net. We find that ð1Þ occupation-
level PDII measures have predictive power for earnings conditional on
O*Net occupation-level measures; and ð2Þ person-level PDII measures
have predictive power for earnings conditional on both PDII and O*Net
occupation-levelmeasures.7 This suggests that tasks are a potentially valu-
able tool for characterizing individual jobs in addition to broader occu-
pations, as is the conventional practice.
In the final section of the paper, we offer two high-level empirical tests
of the Roy model’s implications using the PDII data, and these tests yield
qualified support. Although the primary purpose of our model is to build
intuition for how job tasks “should” be related to worker earnings in equi-
librium, we believe that the general approach and initial empirical evidence
provide a useful foundation for more comprehensive analyses.
I. How Will Job Tasks Be Rewarded in the Labor Market?
Some Simple Theoretical Ideas
The Mincer ð1974Þ earnings model provides the conceptual underpin-
nings for empirical analysis of the market returns to human capital in-
vestments. In theMincermodel, human capital is proxied by education and
potential experience, and the coefficient on years of schooling obtained
from a log earnings regression is interpreted as the compensating dif-
ferential for income forgone while in school. If human capital is unidi-
mensional and markets are competitive, the law of one price applies: the
economy-wide price of human capital should be invariant across jobs.
These assumptions motivate a hedonic model of earnings such as the fol-
lowing:
lnwi 5 a1 b1Si 1 b3Expi 1 b4Exp
2
i 1 b3Xi 1 ei; ð1Þ
where wi is the log hourly wage of worker i, Xi is a vector of person-level
covariates, Si is years of completed schooling, and Expi is potential ex-
perience. In this model, b^1 is an estimate of the market return to a year of
schooling. If the primary cost of schooling is forgone earnings and capital
markets function efficiently, the Mincer model further predicts that the
7 Black and Spitz-Oener ð2010Þ analyze the relationship between job tasks and
wages in West Germany. Distinct from our approach, their task measures are con-
structed at the occupation rather than person level.
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equilibrium rate of return to a year of education should approximately
equal the market interest rate.
S64 Autor/HandelDoes this hedonic reasoning also carry over to the interpretation of the
market returns to job tasks—that is, should we expect the coefficient on
job tasks in a wage regression to capture the equilibrium, economy-wide
price of these tasks? Our answer to this question is no.8 Job tasks differ
from education in two key respects. First, tasks are not durable investment
goods like education that must earn a well-defined market rate of return.
The tasks that a worker performs on the job are an application of that
worker’s skill endowment to a given set of activities, and workers can
modify these task inputs as job requirements change. This ongoing self-
selection of workers into job tasks implies that there will not generally be
a one-to-one mapping between a worker’s stock of human capital and the
job tasks she performs.
The second key distinction between job tasks and years of schooling is
that tasks are a high-dimensional bundle of activities, the elements of
which must be performed jointly to produce output. For example, flight
attendants engage in both interpersonal and physical tasks, construction
workers perform both analytical and physical tasks, and managers per-
form both analytical and interpersonal tasks. In each case, these core job
tasks cannot be unbundled; each worker occupying the job must perform
them.
These two observations—ongoing self-selection of workers into tasks
and bundling of task demands within jobs—motivate a Roy ð1951Þ model
of the allocation of workers to job tasks. We conceive of a job, or, more
broadly, an occupation, as an indivisible bundle of task demands, all of
which are performed simultaneously by each worker in the occupation.
We assume that workers are income maximizing. They self-select into the
occupations that offer the highest wage ðor, more generally, highest util-
ityÞ to the bundle of tasks they are able to produce given their skill en-
dowments. The empirical implications of this model differ significantly
from the Mincerian compensating differentials framework, as we high-
light below.
A. Conceptual Model
We write workers’ skill endowments as a vector of task efficiencies
ðequivalently, abilitiesÞ, where the skill endowment of worker i is written
as Fi 5 ffi1;fi2 : : : ;fiKg. Each element of Fi is a strictly positive number
measuring the efficiency of worker i at task k. Thus, worker i can per-
form fik units of task k in a given time interval. We think of Fi as rep-
resenting a worker’s stock of human capital, and her efficiency in each
8 Our claim here is thus similar to that of Heckman and Scheinkman ð1987Þ, but
our argument is an informal one.
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task may be a result of human capital investments, innate abilities, or some
combination. We make no further assumption on the distribution of F or
Human Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages S65the correlation among its elements except that F has continuous support
on RK11.
9
Occupations produce output using the vector of K tasks, where the
productive value of tasks differs among occupation. This assumption dif-
fers from the Mincerian framework for human capital in which the mar-
ginal productivity of education is equated across sectors. It is logical for
job tasks, however, due to occupation-level indivisibilities.10
Let the output of worker i in occupation j equal:
Yij 5 e
aj1ΣKljkfik1mi ; ð2Þ
where ljk ≥ 0 ∀ j; k and mi is a worker-specific error term. Note that aj is
not constrained to be positive, such that a worker with insufficient skills
at the occupation’s key tasks would have a negative marginal product ðe.g.,
an untrained airline pilotÞ. We normalize the output price for each oc-
cupation at unity. This normalization is not restrictive since a logarith-
mic change in the market price of an occupation’s output is equivalent to
a multiplicative change in the exponentiated terms of ð2Þ.11 Thus, we can
summarize the production structure of occupation j with the vector Lj 5
faj; lj1; lj2; : : : ; ljKg.
If workers are paid their marginal product, the log wage of worker i in
occupation j is:
wi 5 aj 1 o
K
ljkfik 1 mi: ð3Þ
Taking this production structure as given, each worker chooses the oc-
cupation j that maximizes her output and hence earnings:
Yi 5 max
j
fYi1;Yi2; : : : YiK ; g5 max
j
faj 1 FiL0jg: ð4Þ
This economy is characterized by self-selection of workers into occu-
pations based on comparative advantage. In equilibrium, the marginal
worker in occupation j is indifferent between that occupation and the
9 The assumptions that all elements of F are positive and have continuous
support assures that the self-selection of workers into occupations is well deter-
mined. Absent this assumption, two occupations that offered different rewards to
a specific task k0 but identical rewards to all other tasks could be equally attractive
to a given worker ði.e., if that worker’s endowment had fk0 5 0Þ.
10 Firpo et al. ð2011Þ adopt a similar assumption.
11 We could equivalently write eq. ð2Þ as Yij 5 exp

pj

a0j 1oKl0jkfik 1 ðmi=pjÞ

,
where pj > 0 is a productivity shifter that reflects market demand and other factors,
a0j 5 aj=pj, and l
0
jk 5 ljk=pj.
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next best alternative.12 Inframarginal workers, however, strictly prefer the
occupation they have selected relative to any alternative. Observe that
S66 Autor/Handeltask returns in this model are occupation specific: yw=yfkjJ5j 5 ljk. The
equilibrium of the model ensures that workers are employed in the oc-
cupation that has the highest reward to their bundle of tasks. But this does
not imply that workers necessarily receive the maximummarket reward to
each element in their task bundle or that each element is equally valuable in
all occupations.
B. Some Straightforward Empirical Implications
As is well understood, identifying the market locus of the “return to
skills” in the presence of self-selection is not empirically straightforward
ðHeckman and Scheinkman 1986; Heckman and Honore´ 1990Þ. Given the
nonrandom assignment of workers to occupations, a regression of log
wages on workers’ job tasks will not generally recover the average returns
to those tasks. Concretely, workers with high efficiencies in given tasks
will sort toward occupations that have high rewards for those tasks. The
average “return to tasks” observed in the datawill therefore not correspond
to the average return over all occupations ðe.g., if workers were randomly
assigned to occupationsÞ.
Estimating task returns using observational data is particularly chal-
lenging when the rewards to clusters of tasks are correlated. Consider, for
example, a hypothetical case where the marginal productivity of physi-
cally demanding ðmanualÞ tasks is strictly positive in all occupations ðljm
> 0 ∀ jÞ but the productivity of manual tasks is highest in occupations
that have comparatively low returns to other major task categories ðe.g.,
analytical tasksÞ, soCovðljm; ljaÞ < 0. LetMi and Ai denote the intensity of
worker i0s manual and analytical task input on the job, respectively. An
ordinary least squares ðOLSÞ regression of log wages on individual task
input of the following form,
wi 5 a1 bAAi 1 bMMi 1 ei; ð5Þ
may potentially recover a “return” to physically demanding tasks that is
negative ði.e., b^M < 0Þ. This spurious inference would arise because the
cross-occupation correlation between the returns to physical and analytical12 This assumes that occupations are sufficiently “close together” that there is a
marginal worker in each occupation. With a finite set of occupations, it is con-
ceivable that all workers would strictly prefer the occupation they are in. This
would not affect our substantive conclusions.
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tasks is negative, even though the within-occupation return to physical
tasks is uniformly positive.13
Human Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages S67Without further strong assumptions on the distribution of task en-
dowments, it would be infeasible to identify the structural parameters that
underlie this model. The model does, however, imply some testable re-
strictions on the relationship between tasks and wages that do not rely on
these parameters.
PROPOSITION 1. Let G be the set of all occupations that have non-
zero employment in equilibrium. For each occupation j ∈ G, it must
be the case that Lj is not vector dominated by some other occupation
Lj0 where j0 ∈ G.
This proposition says that for occupation j to attract workers ðand thus
belong to GÞ, there cannot be an alternative occupation j0 that has both a
higher intercept and a higher return to all tasks. If such an occupation
existed, all workers in occupation j would strictly prefer occupation j0 and
hence j ∉ G.
PROPOSITION 2. For all occupations j ∈ G, the cross-occupation
covariance among task returns cannot be uniformly positive across
all task pairs k; k0. That is, either Covðlk; lk0 Þ ≤ 0 for some k; k0, or
Covða; lkÞ for some k, or both.
To see why this proposition holds, consider a case where all occupations
use only one task k, so each occupation j can be described by the double
Lj 5 faj; ljg. For each occupation j ∈ G, it must be the case that YjðfkÞ >
Yj0 ðfkÞ ∀ j ≠ j \ j0 ∈ G for some value of fk. That is, there must be a worker
i who prefers occupation j to j0. Given that j0 ∈ G, however, there must
also be some value of fk0 ≠ fk such that Yjðfk0 Þ < Yj0 ðfk0 Þ, so some worker
i0 prefers j0 to j. Jointly, these restrictions imply that
ðaj 2 a0jÞ  ðlj 2 l0jÞ: ð6Þ
That is, the returns to tasks must negatively covary within the set of
occupations that have positive employment. Were this not so, some sub-
set of workers could be made strictly better off by changing occupations.
This reasoning extends to the case of multiple tasks: the covariances among
task returns, and between task returns and the intercept, cannot be uni-13 This bias will be present if there is nonzero cross-occupation correlation
between the returns to physical and analytical tasks. The sign and magnitude of
the bias will depend on both the sign and magnitude of the covariance term and
the magnitude of cross-occupation variances in task returns.
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formly positive.14 We explore this proposition below, but it should be
acknowledged that it does not offer a very restrictive test of the Roymodel.
S68 Autor/HandelIt establishes a necessary but not sufficient condition for the data to be
consistent with self-selection, which is that occupations with positive em-
ployment are preferred by some, but not all, workers depending upon their
task endowments.
In the subsequent data analysis, we also analyze a second empirical
implication of the Roy model: workers who have higher efficiency—
equivalently, ability—in a given task domain will generally self-select into
occupations that have a higher return to that task. To formalize this idea,
and delineate under what conditions it holds, we extend the simple case
considered above in proposition 2 to a parametric selection setting with
normally distributed task efficiencies.
Consider a case with two occupations, j and j0, and two distinct tasks,
k and k0. Let the corresponding price vectors be Lj 5 faj; l1; l2g and
Lj0 5 fa0j; l01; l02g. Log wages continue to be given by equation ð3Þ. To
simplify the analysis, we assume that occupation j rewards only task 1 and
occupation j0 rewards only task 2: l1; l02 > 0 and l2 5 l
0
1 5 0. Let the
population distribution of worker endowments of tasks 1 and 2 be given
by the bivariate unit normal distribution:
ε1
ε2
 
∼N 0
0
 
;
1 :
j12 1
  	
: ð7Þ
To conserve notation, define v5 ε12 ε2 equal to the difference in a
worker’s efficiency in task 1 versus task 2—so, a worker with v > 0 has
relatively greater efficiency in task 1 while a worker with v < 0 has rela-
tively greater efficiency in task 2.
Following the derivation in Borjas ð1994Þ, we can calculate the expected
task endowments of workers who self-select into each occupation as:
E½ε1ji5 j5 l1l
0
2
jv
l1
l02
2 r
 	
fð2zÞ
FðzÞ
 	
E½ε2ji5 j05 l1l
0
2
jv
r2
l02
l1
 	
fð2zÞ
FðzÞ
 	
;
ð8Þ
where z5 ða0j 2 ajÞ=jv, r5 l1l02j12=l1l02j1j2 5 j12, and fðzÞ=Fð2zÞ is the
Inverse Mills Ratio.
These equations imply that workers with above average capabilities in
tasks 1 and 2, respectively, will self-select into the occupations that dif-
ferentially reward these tasks ð j and j0Þ if and only if the population
correlation between workers’ abilities in these two tasks is not too high.
14 It does not need to be negative for all elements, however.This content downloaded from 18.7.29.240 on Tue, 10 Mar 2015 13:28:11 PM
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PROPOSITION 3. A necessary condition for workers to be positively
self-selected on task 1 capability into occupation j and on task 2
Human Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages S69capability into occupation j0 is that
r <min
l1
l02
;
l02
l1
 	
: ð9Þ
A sufficient condition for this expression to hold is that r ≤ 0:
worker abilities in tasks 1 and 2 are either uncorrelated or negatively
correlated.
This proposition says that if the correlation between worker abilities in
each task is not too high,workerswill self-select into occupations that offer
high returns to the tasks in which they are particularly well endowed—
meaning that self-selection takes the form of comparative advantage.
What are the empirical implications of proposition 3 for wages? If we
were to estimate equation ð5Þ above by OLS with two tasks, the presence
of heterogeneous task returns implies that this equation would be too
restrictive: the b’s should be allowed to vary by occupation. We can make
progress, however, by observing that self-selection implies that we will
observe nonzero covariances between occupation-level task returns and
the task endowments of workers who self-select into these occupations.
To recover these covariances, we can estimate an augmented version of
equation ð5Þwhere we interact occupational task means with worker-level
task inputs:
wij 5 a1 bAAi 1 bMMi 1 dAAj 1 dMMj 1 gAAi Aj 1 gMMi Mj 1 eij:
ð10Þ
Following proposition 3, two cases emerge that make different predictions
on the signs of the interaction terms gA, gM in this equation.
The first case, which we refer to as comparative advantage, is a setting
where workers are positively self-selected into each occupation. This oc-
curs when the correlation between worker abilities across tasks is suffi-
ciently low that equation ð9Þ is satisfied. This implies that there will be a
positive covariance between occupational task returns and the task endow-
ments of workers in each occupation. Hence, task returns will be higher in
occupations that differentially use each task. Formally, this implies that gA,
gM > 0.
Conversely, if the population distribution of skills has a strong element
of absolute advantage—that is, workers who excel at task 1 also excel at
task 2—then positive self-selection on task 1 into occupation jmust imply
negative self-selection on task 2 into occupation j0, and vice versa. Hence,
if one occupation has workers who are particularly productive at the taskThis content downloaded from 18.7.29.240 on Tue, 10 Mar 2015 13:28:11 PM
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that the occupation differentially rewards, the second occupation will
have workers who are relatively unproductive at the task that the occu-
S70 Autor/Handelpation differentially rewards.15 The empirical prediction here is therefore
weaker: at least one of the task interaction terms must be positive. For-
mally, min½gA; gM > 0.
In the subsequent empirical sections, we test the two sets of comple-
mentary empirical implications following from propositions 2 and 3: task
returns across occupations are not uniformly positively correlated ði.e.,
they are negatively correlated for at least one task categoryÞ; and workers
are positively self-selected into occupations along at least one task di-
mension. Since these implications are admittedly not highly restrictive, we
view the tests of the model as exploratory rather than dispositive.
Although the implications that we develop here are cross-sectional, a
theoretical setting in which workers differ in their productivity across
tasks and task returns differ across occupations also has immediate im-
plications for the evolution of job changes and wage growth over the
course of the career. Lazear ð2009Þ provides a general theoretical state-
ment of this problem, while Neal ð1999Þ, Gibbons et al. ð2005Þ, and Gath-
mann and Scho¨nberg ð2010Þ develop and test detailed empirical implica-
tions. Gathman and Scho¨nberg’s ð2010Þ longitudinal study, which employs
occupation-level measures of job tasks, is particularly germane. A key result
is thatwhenworkers change jobs, theymovemostly tonewoccupations that
have task requirements that are similar to those of their previous occupa-
tions. Althoughwe cannot explore similar longitudinal patterns in the cross-
sectional data collected for this analysis, we view this body of work linking
workers’ task productivities to their employment and wage dynamics as
extremely promising.
II. Data Sources
The primary data source for our analysis is a module of the Princeton
Data Improvement Initiative survey ðPDIIÞ that collects data on the
cognitive, interpersonal, and physical job tasks that workers regularly
perform on their jobs. Our primary analyses focus on three broad di-
mensions motivated by the conceptual framework in Autor et al. 2003:
abstract problem solving and creative, organizational, andmanagerial tasks
ð“Abstract tasks”Þ; routine, codifiable cognitive and manual tasks that
15 Note that absolute advantage is a special case of comparative advantage where
there is a positive hierarchical ranking of workers by ability across all activities.
Even in this case, the assignment of workers to occupations is determined by
comparative advantage: labor market clearing implies that all skill groups will hold
comparative advantage ðafter accounting for labor costsÞ in some set of occupa-
tions. What is distinctive about the absolute advantage case relative to the standard
comparative advantage case is that in equilibrium not all workers are assigned to
the activity in which they have the highest productivity.
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follow explicit procedures ð“Routine tasks”Þ; and nonroutine manual job
tasks that require physical adaptability ð“Manual tasks”Þ.
Human Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages S71Four items from the PDII elicit information on Abstract job demands:
ð1Þ the length of longest document typically read as part of the job
ðranging from one page or less to more than 25 pagesÞ; ð2Þ frequency of
mathematics tasks involving high school or higher mathematics ðalgebra,
geometry, trigonometry, probability/statistics, or calculusÞ; ð3Þ frequency
of problem-solving tasks requiring at least 30 minutes to find a good
solution; and ð4Þ proportion of workday managing or supervising other
workers. The items are combined into a standardized scale of Abstract
tasks using the first component of a principal components analysis, which
accounts for 41% of their variation.
Four items from the PDII were used to identify jobs with Routine tasks:
ð1Þ proportion of the workday spent performing short, repetitive tasks
and complete absence of face-to-face interactions with ð2Þ customers or
clients, ð3Þ suppliers or contractors, or ð4Þ students or trainees.16 The items
are combined into a standardized scale of Routine tasks using the first
component of a principal components analysis, which accounts for 56%
of their variation.
A single PDII item elicits information on Manual job tasks: proportion
of the workday spent performing physical tasks such as standing, oper-
ating machinery or vehicles, or making or fixing things by hand. This var-
iable is also standardized for our analyses.
For most analyses, we use a consistent sample of cases with full infor-
mation on tasks, demographics, human capital, and wages, and with at
least two cases per six-digit Standard Occupational Classification ðSOCÞ
system ðn 5 1,333Þ. For analyses that estimate returns to tasks separately
by occupation, the regression model requires at least five cases per occu-
pation for identification, which further limits the sample.17 Summary sta-
tistics for our primary sample are given in appendix table A1.
Many of the task questions contained in the PDII are adapted from
the survey of Skills, Technology, and Management Practices ðSTAMPÞ
written and fielded by Handel ð2007, 2008a, 2008b; see also Hilton 2008Þ.
Handel ð2008aÞ provides an extensive discussion of the conceptual basis,
16 These questions are from the PDII module that measures the suitability of
jobs for international offshoring ðBlinder and Krueger 2008Þ.
17 Our precise sample restrictions in sequence, based on an initial PDII sample of
2,500 cases, are: currently working ð238 observations droppedÞ; ages 18–64 ð211 ob-
servations droppedÞ; nonmissing task measures ð35 observations droppedÞ; non-
missing education ð6 observations droppedÞ; nonmissing wage data ð486 observa-
tions droppedÞ; nonmissing, nonmilitary, andnonfarmoccupation ð36 observations
droppedÞ; at least two valid observations in each occupation ð168 observations
droppedÞ. Finally, in the exercise where five valid observations are required per
occupation, an additional 405 observations are dropped.
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validity, and reliability of the STAMP measures, which generalizes to the
closely related PDII measures. Handel ð2008bÞ presents preliminary re-
S72 Autor/Handelsults from the STAMP survey, which can be compared to results pre-
sented below.
An alternative source of information on job content is the US De-
partment of Labor’s Occupational Information Network ðO*NetÞ, which
contains occupation-level measures and replaces the Dictionary of Occu-
pational Titles as an official career counseling tool. The O*Net database,
many years in the making, is only beginning to be used by academic re-
searchers but is a useful point of comparison. If parallel measures from the
PDII and O*Net are highly correlated, this offers evidence of what psy-
chologists call convergent validity. Comparing results across wage re-
gressions provides evidence on the relative strengths of two different ap-
proaches to measuring task input ðHandel 2008aÞ and the value added
of person-level relative to occupation-level job content measures. The
O*Net-based Abstract, Routine, and Manual scales are from Acemoglu
andAutor ð2011Þ and useO*Net items that appear likely to capture similar
dimensions of task input as the PDII. TheO*Net scales are matched to the
PDII person records at the six-digit SOC 2000 occupation level. The ap-
pendix provides further details on the O*Net measures.
Other approaches to providing job task measures alongside human
capital variables at the person level include the German IAB/BIBB data
set and the British Skills Survey, which are repeated cross-sections of
workers over one or two decades ðSpitz-Oener 2006; Felstead et al. 2007;
Dustmann et al. 2009Þ. If the PDII analyses prove illuminating, they may
suggest the utility of a similar time series for the United States.
III. Job Tasks: Levels and Differences among
Education and Occupation Groups
A. Descriptive Statistics
The PDII measures provide a snapshot of the skill levels and task
content of US jobs ðtable 1Þ. Only about one-quarter ð24%Þ of wage and
salary workers use any kind of higher-level math on at least a weekly
basis, while about one-third ð37%Þ read documents longer than six pages
on a regular basis as part of their jobs. Along with similar results from the
STAMP survey, these are the first figures on the actual levels of math and
reading that individuals use on their jobs. A far larger percentage report
engaging in extended problem solving either daily ð47%Þ orweekly ð29%Þ.
Approximately 29% manage or supervise others at least half the time on
their jobs.
More than half ð51%Þ of wage and salary workers have a lot of contact
with customers or clients as part of their jobs. Not surprisingly, far fewerThis content downloaded from 18.7.29.240 on Tue, 10 Mar 2015 13:28:11 PM
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people have a lot of contact with students or trainees ð22%Þ and suppliers
ð11%Þ as part of their jobs.
Human Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages S73Slightly more than half ð51%Þ of workers report spending more than
half their time on short, repetitive tasks, and almost two-thirds ð60%Þ
report spending at least half their time doing physical tasks, such as stand-
ing, handling objects, or operating equipment.
Because these characteristics describe important dimensions of both
jobs and the persons selected into them, one expects the measures to be
associated with both demographic and job characteristics. Subsequent col-
umns of table 1 summarize PDII responses by gender, race ðwhite, black,
HispanicÞ, and education ðless than high school, high school only, some
college, college degree or greaterÞ.18 There are striking differences across
gender, race, and education categories in all task activities. For example,
females are substantially more likely than males to spend at least half of
their time on repetitive tasks ð58% versus 44%Þ, and blacks and Hispanics
are substantially more likely than whites to spend at least half of their time
on physical job tasks ðthese percentages are 56%, 70%, and 76% for
whites, blacks, and Hispanics, respectivelyÞ.
The lower panel of table 1 presents means and standard deviations for
the standardized task scales. Most notably, the gap between high school
dropouts and those with college or more is about one standard deviation
for Abstract and Manual tasks and about three-quarters of a standard
deviation for Routine.
Table 2 shows breakdowns by one-digit occupation. In this case, the
largest and smallest means differ by approximately 1.4 standard deviations
for Manual tasks, by 1.3 standard deviations for Abstract tasks, and by 1.2
standard deviations for Routine tasks. Broad occupation does a better job
than personal education in identifying individuals who perform most of
the interpersonal tasks.
The first two panels of table 3 present correlations of the items and
scales with one another and with education and six-digit occupation. Edu-
cation correlates moderately to strongly with the scales for Manual tasks
ð20.41Þ, Routine tasks ð20.39Þ, and Abstract tasks ð0.38Þ, as well as the
item for reading ð0.33Þ. The correlations with detailed occupation were
calculated by regressing item and scale values on the 241 unique six-digit
occupation dummies present in the data, and taking the square root of
R-squared to calculate the multiple correlation coefficient. These correla-
tions are much larger than those involving personal education, ranging
from 0.60 to 0.79. This is not entirely surprising given that the occupation
level regressions contain 241 explanatory variables whereas the bivariate
18 A fourth race group, Asian, makes up 1.5% of the sample. Because of the very
small number of respondents ð12Þ, we do not separately tabulate this group.This content downloaded from 18.7.29.240 on Tue, 10 Mar 2015 13:28:11 PM
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correlations contain, by definition, only one explanatory variable. Taken
together, the PDII task measures show generally sensible patterns of var-
Human Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages S79iation across education and occupational groups and provide concrete in-
formation on what people do on their jobs and the share of the workforce
performing each task at different intensities.
The third panel of table 3 presents correlations between the O*Net
scales and the corresponding PDII scales, measured both at the individual
level ðcol. 1Þ and averaged by detailed occupation to match the level of
O*Net’s aggregation ðcol. 2Þ. The occupation-level correlations in col-
umn 2 are larger, which is expected given that the O*Net measures only
vary at the occupation level and thus cannot covary with PDII responses
within occupations.
The PDII measures of Abstract and Manual tasks correlate strongly
with their O*Net counterparts, particularly when PDII occupation means
are used ð0.63–0.65Þ. The correlations between the PDII and O*Net Rou-
tine scales are somewhat lower, but still moderate to strong at 0.33 and
0.48. These results are evidence of a reasonably high degree of convergent
validity for the PDII measures.
B. Explaining Differences in Job Tasks: The Roles of Human
Capital, Occupation, and Demographic Characteristics
Although almost all analyses of job tasks treat tasks as an occupation-
level construct, a virtue of the PDII’s individual-level task measures is that
they permit investigation of the variance of job tasks within occupations
and the degree to which this variation is systematically related to worker
as well as job attributes. This section analyzes the extent to which the tasks
workers perform on the job can be explained by their individual human
capital, demographic attributes, and the technical requirements of the job
itself, proxied by detailed occupation dummies. Our descriptive OLS re-
gressions take the following form:
Tij 5 a1 d1Si 1 d1Xi 1 gj 1 eij; ð11Þ
where the vector S includes human capital measures ðeducation, potential
experience, primary languageÞ, X is a vector of demographic character-
istics ðrace, ethnicity, sexÞ, and g is a vector of 240 occupation dummies
ðwith one omittedÞ.19 The reference group for this regression is white male
English-speaking high school graduates.20
Table 4 presents regressions results for the standardized Abstract, Rou-
tine, and Manual scales. Models 1, 3, and 5 use demographic and human
19 For primary language a dummy variable equals one for individuals who re-
quired the Spanish-language version of the PDII questionnaire.
20 We code the 4.7% of respondents in our main sample who were interviewed
in Spanish as primary Spanish-language speakers.
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capital variables to predict the task content of jobs. These models explain
16%–25% of the variation in the task measures. Augmenting these mod-
Table 4
Regressions of Standardized PDII Task Variables on Demographics,
Human Capital Measures, and Occupation Dummies
Dependent Variable
Abstract Routine Manual
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
Less than high school .05 .01 2.21 2.06 .00 .04
ð.10Þ ð.11Þ .10 ð.11Þ ð.10Þ ð.09Þ
Some college .34 .04 2.26 2.17 2.27 .07
ð.07Þ ð.07Þ .07 ð.07Þ ð.06Þ ð.06Þ
College .71 .10 2.56 2.20 2.87 2.29
ð.07Þ ð.08Þ .07 ð.09Þ ð.07Þ ð.07Þ
Postcollege .99 .33 2.91 2.33 21.09 2.45
ð.08Þ ð.10Þ .09 ð.11Þ ð.08Þ ð.09Þ
Experience .03 .02 2.03 2.02 2.02 2.01
ð.01Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ
Experience2/100 2.08 2.05 .05 .04 .03 .02
ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.01Þ
Spanish language 2.65 2.61 .54 .54 .31 .23
ð.14Þ ð.14Þ ð.15Þ ð.15Þ ð.14Þ ð.12Þ
Female 2.31 2.04 .27 .15 2.06 .07
ð.05Þ ð.06Þ ð.05Þ ð.06Þ ð.05Þ ð.05Þ
Black 2.13 .05 2.01 .00 .12 .05
ð.08Þ ð.08Þ ð.08Þ ð.09Þ ð.08Þ ð.07Þ
Hispanic .09 .35 .12 .02 .17 .00
ð.08Þ ð.08Þ ð.08Þ ð.09Þ ð.07Þ ð.07Þ
Asian 2.12 2.28 .03 .21 2.17 .04
ð.17Þ ð.17Þ ð.17Þ ð.18Þ ð.16Þ ð.15Þ
240 occupation dummies No Yes No Yes No Yes
R-squared .21 .55 .16 .49 .25 .65
FðEducation variablesÞ 47.6 2.7 33.7 2.7 69.9 11.6
p-value .00 .03 .00 .03 .00 .00
FðGender 1 raceÞ 11.6 5.4 7.5 1.6 2.5 .6
p-value .00 .00 .00 .16 .04 .67
NOTE.—n 5 1,333. Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a constant and are weighted
by sampling weights.
S80 Autor/Handelels with 240 detailed occupation dummies in columns 2, 4, and 6 increases
the explanatory power to between 49% and 65%. All of the effects of
education on Abstract tasks except for postcollege are fully mediated by
occupational assignment—that is, conditioning on occupation dummies
substantially attenuates the coefficients and eliminates their statistical sig-
nificance. The relationships between education and performance of Rou-
tine and Manual tasks tend to remain significant after the addition of oc-
cupation dummies, but the coefficients drop substantially. By contrast, the
inclusion of occupation controls has little effect on the strong negative
association between Spanish-language primacy and Abstract tasks on theThis content downloaded from 18.7.29.240 on Tue, 10 Mar 2015 13:28:11 PM
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one hand, and the strong positive associations between Spanish-language
primacy and use of Routine and Manual tasks on the other hand. Females’
Human Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages S81lower use of Abstract tasks, controlling for human capital, is fully medi-
ated by occupation, while their higher use of Routine tasks persists after
controlling for occupation. None of the coefficients for black are signif-
icant, while Hispanic ethnicity seems to be positively related to Abstract
tasks once occupation is controlled.
In sum, the models suggest that a substantial proportion of Abstract
task content is “hard wired” into occupations. Individual human capital
remains relevant, however, for workers with a graduate education and for
Spanish-language speakers, even after accounting for occupation effects.
While the substantial female-male gap in the use of Abstract tasks is en-
tirely accounted for by occupation, the higher propensity of females to
engage in Routine tasks is not.21
These results and others not reported ð2009Þ are notable for revealing
the structuring power of occupations as determinants of job content.
Indeed, occupation is the dominant measurable predictor of job tasks in
our data. Alongside this fact, measures of human capital—in particular,
higher education and Spanish-language primacy—are significant pre-
dictors of within- as well as between-occupation variation in job tasks.
Human capital therefore plays a dual role in determining workers’ job
tasks, both allocating workers to occupations and influencing their job
tasks within occupations ðalthough it is apparent that the occupation
channel is quantitatively largerÞ. Race and sex are also strong predictors of
workers’ job tasks across all categories. But the relationship between race,
sex, and job tasks runs largely, although not entirely, through occupa-
tional assignment; we find relatively few systematic race or sex differences
in job task demands among workers within occupations.
IV. Job Tasks and Wages: Descriptive Regressions
A. Predicting Wages Using the PDII Measures
Industrial psychologists typically view occupational titles as coherent,
well-defined job categories rather than merely as pragmatic classification
tools, and hence tend to treat all within-occupation variation as measure-
ment error ðHarvey 1991; Peterson et al. 1999Þ. To what extent does
within-occupation variation in self-reported job tasks capture substantive
differences, rather than noise, in job content? If self-reported variation in
job tasks is a robust predictor of wages, this would provide prima facie
21 Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz ð2009Þ find that among US workers obtaining an
MBA from a top US business school between 1990 and 2006, substantial gender
gaps in career advancement develop and accumulate within a few years of grad-
uation, reflecting differences in training prior to MBA completion, differences in
career interruptions, and differences in weekly hours.
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evidence that self-reported task variation is likely to be informative about
job content even within occupations.22
Table 5
OLS Regressions of Log Hourly Wages on Task Scales, Demographic
Variables, and Occupation Dummies
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ ð7Þ
Abstract .20 .12 .07 .07
ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ
Routine 2.10 2.03 2.03 2.01
ð.02Þ ð.01Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ
Manual 2.19 2.11 2.15 2.11
ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ
Less than high school .10 .09 .07 .08
ð.06Þ ð.06Þ ð.06Þ ð.06Þ
Some college .17 .09 .06 .06
ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.04Þ
College .53 .34 .25 .21
ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.05Þ ð.05Þ
Postcollege .75 .49 .41 .33
ð.05Þ ð.05Þ ð.06Þ ð.06Þ
Experience .04 .03 .02 .02
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Experience2/100 2.06 2.05 2.03 2.03
ð.01Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ ð.01Þ
Spanish language 2.55 2.42 2.34 2.27
ð.08Þ ð.08Þ ð.08Þ ð.08Þ
Female 2.30 2.26 2.12 2.11
ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.04Þ ð.03Þ
Black 2.13 2.10 2.13 2.12
ð.05Þ ð.04Þ ð.05Þ ð.05Þ
Hispanic 2.08 2.07 2.01 2.03
ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.05Þ ð.05Þ
Asian .13 .13 .09 .11
ð.10Þ ð.09Þ ð.10Þ ð.10Þ
240 occupation dummies No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared .39 .30 .61 .45 .65 .64 .67
FðEducation 1 demographic
variablesÞ 59.8 26.2 10.4 7.7
p-value .00 .00 .00 .00
FðTask measuresÞ 192.1 47.9 27.3 16.0
p-value .00 .00 .00 .00
FðOccupation dummiesÞ 7.1 3.3 4.1 2.8
p-value .00 .00 .00 .00
NOTE.—n 5 1,333. Standard errors are in parentheses. All models include a constant and are weighted
by sampling weights.
S82 Autor/HandelWe examine the relationship between tasks and wages in table 5 by re-
gressing workers’ log hourly wages on their self-reported job tasks, as well
as human capital, demographic background, and detailed occupation vari-
22 An alternative interpretation would be that omitted worker characteristics
affect both wages and self-reported jobs tasks but do not affect actual job tasksThis content downloaded from 18.7.29.240 on Tue, 10 Mar 2015 13:28:11 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
ables. As a benchmark, column 1 presents a standard cross-sectional Min-
cerian wage regression of hourly wages on human capital and demographic
Human Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages S83measures. All variables in this regression have the expected signs and mag-
nitudes. The R-squared of this model is equal to 0.39, comparable to
standard cross-sectional models estimated using the Current Population
Survey.
Column 2 replaces the human capital and demographic controls with
the three tasks scales, which predict substantial wage differentials. A one
standard deviation increase in the Abstract task scale is associated with a
20% wage premium, while similar increases in Routine and Manual tasks
are associated with wage penalties of 10% and 19%, respectively. By them-
selves, the three task scales account for 30% of the variation in log wages,
which is 25% less than the full set of human capital and demographic mea-
sures. When 240 detailed occupation dummies are used in place of the task
measures ðcol. 3Þ, they account for 61% of wage variation.
The remainder of the table demonstrates that these three sets of vari-
ables—human capital and demographics, job tasks, and occupation—
capture distinct sources of wage variance. The task measures remain sig-
nificant predictors of wages conditional on either human capital and de-
mographic measures ðcol. 4Þ or a full set of occupation dummies ðcol. 6Þ.
Similarly, the human capital measures are also robust to inclusion of either
task measures ðcol. 4Þ or occupation variables ðcol. 5Þ. Indeed, when all
three clusters of variables are entered simultaneously, each is a significant
predictor of wages ðcol. 7Þ. Notably, comparing the Wald tests for the
joint significance of each group of variables ðbottom row of table 7Þ, we
find that the F-statistic for the task measures is substantially larger than for
the other two groups of variables.
While statistical significance is not synonymous with economic sig-
nificance, the economic magnitude of the relationship between tasks and
wages—even net of other variables—is sizable. Within occupations, a one
standard deviation increase in Abstract tasks predicts a 7 log point wage
premium. A one standard deviation increase in Manual tasks predicts a
15 log point wage penalty ðcol. 6Þ. When human capital and gender con-
trols are also included ðcol. 7Þ, these effects are diminished slightly but
remain large and significant. Among these three measures, the Routine
task variable proves least robust, losing significance when either human
capital controls ðcol. 4Þ or occupation dummies ðcol. 6Þ are included.
One aspect of these results merits particular emphasis. The estimates in
table 4 indicate that even within occupations, there are systematic dif-
ferences in job tasks among workers who differ according to human cap-
ital, race, and gender. This pattern directly implies that job tasks must also
be predictive of wages—since tasks are correlated with education, demo-
per se ðor do not affect wages through tasksÞ. We cannot dismiss this possibility out
of hand, althoughwe doubt that it is the primary explanation for the findings below.
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graphics, and occupation, and these variables are in turn predictors of
wages. What is not known from the prior results, however, is whether the
S84 Autor/Handelresidual variation in job tasks remaining after netting out occupation, ed-
ucation, race, and sex is also predictive of wages. Column 7 of table 5
reveals that this residual variation is indeed predictive of wages. These
results indicate that self-reported job tasks capture substantive differences
in job activities among workers, both within and between occupations.
B. Do PDII Task Measures Add Value to O*Net Task Measures?
A further means to assess the value added of the individual-level PDII
measures is to compare their predictive power with the corresponding
O*Net measures. In this section, we use the O*Net measures introduced
in table 3, along with the PDII measures used in the prior two tables, to
make this comparison. The first column of table 6 repeats the simple re-
gression of wages on the Abstract, Routine, and Manual task measures
from table 5. Here we cluster standard errors at the occupation rather than
person level because we will also be using occupation-level means of PDII
and O*Net variables as predictors.
In column 2, we replace the individual-level scales with PDII occupa-
tional means, following the O*Net approach.23 These occupation-level
scales are also highly significant predictors of earnings.When both person-
and occupation-level task measures are entered simultaneously ðcol. 3Þ,
both sets of variables remain highly significant, and this remains true when
human capital and demographic controls are added to the model ðcol. 4Þ.24
Notably, the F-value of the person-level task measures substantially exceeds
the F-value of the occupation-level measures. Given that measurement error
in tasks will generally be greater at the person level than at the occupation
level, this pattern argues strongly that the person-level task measures are
informative. Perhaps surprisingly, the person- and occupation-level re-
lationships between job tasks and wages are quite similar for Abstract and
Routine tasks across columns 1 and 2. The occupation-level Manual task
measure is substantially attenuated, however, when the person-level Man-
ual measure is included in column 3.25
23 To avoid confounding the predictive power of occupational averages with the
direct correlation between a worker’s own tasks and wages, the PDII occupational
mean assigned to each observation is a “leave-out” mean, equal to the grand mean
of the task measure for all workers in the occupation except for the current worker.
24 Demographic variables are included in table 6 in all columns that include
human capital measures, but we do not report them to conserve space.
25 The table reports tests of the joint hypothesis that the coefficient of each of
the three person-level task measures is equal to the corresponding occupation-
level measure. We further test these restrictions for each task measure separately
and readily accept the null hypothesis for the Routine and Abstract measures in all
specifications. Conversely, we always reject the null for the Manual task measure.
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Table 6
OLS Wage Regressions of Log Hourly Wages on Task Measures from O*Net
and PDII ðat the Person and Occupation LevelÞ
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ ð7Þ ð8Þ ð9Þ
PDII Abstract ðperson
levelÞ .20 .13 .09 .14 .11 .08
ð.03Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.03Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ
PDII Routine ðperson levelÞ 2.10 2.05 2.01 2.07 2.05 2.01
ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ
PDII Manual ðperson levelÞ 2.19 2.15 2.09 2.18 2.16 2.10
ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ
PDII Abstract ðocc meanÞ .22 .12 .07 .14 .08 .04
ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.02Þ
PDII Routine ðocc meanÞ 2.08 2.06 2.02 2.05 2.05 2.02
ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.02Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ
PDII Manual ðocc meanÞ 2.10 2.01 2.01 2.10 2.03 2.01
ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.02Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ
O*Net Abstract ðocc meanÞ .36 .22 .22 .17 .11
ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.04Þ
O*Net Routine ðocc meanÞ .01 .02 .03 .03 .02
ð.06Þ ð.05Þ ð.05Þ ð.04Þ ð.03Þ
O*Net Manual ðocc levelÞ .06 .11 .10 .12 .06
ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ
Less than high school .07 .08
ð.09Þ ð.09Þ
Some college .06 .05
ð.04Þ ð.04Þ
College .29 .26
ð.06Þ ð.05Þ
Postcollege .44 .40
ð.07Þ ð.07Þ
Experience .03 .03
ð.00Þ ð.00Þ
Experience2/100 2.05 2.04
ð.01Þ ð.01Þ
Spanish language 2.44 2.39
ð.15Þ ð.15Þ
R-squared .30 .27 .34 .46 .25 .37 .32 .38 .48
FðPDII person levelÞ 69.2 25.0 14.5 35.4 22.5 13.3
p-value .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00
FðPDII occ meansÞ 44.4 9.1 3.8 17.2 4.5 1.6
p-value .00 .00 .01 .00 .00 .19
FðEquality of PDII person-
and occ-level coefsÞ 3.6 2.1 3.2 2.5
p-value .01 .10 .02 .06
FðO*Net occ meansÞ 38.4 12.8 11.0 9.1 3.4
p-value .00 .00 .00 .00 .02
FðEducation variablesÞ 14.2 13.3
p-value .00 .00
NOTE.—n 5 1,333. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on occupation ð241 categoriesÞ. All
models include a constant and are weighted by sampling weights. Columns 4 and 9 additionally include
dummies for female, black, Asian, and Hispanic. occ 5 occupation.
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In columns 5–9 of table 6, we introduce the O*Net measures and com-
pare their performance with the PDII scales. Column 5 shows that the
S86 Autor/Handelstandardized O*Net Abstract scale has a stronger effect on wages ð0.36Þ
than the parallel PDII Abstract scale calculated at the occupational level
ð0.22Þ. But when both O*Net and PDII occupation-level scales are in-
cluded in column 7, both coefficients remain large.
We find less comparability between the PDII and O*Net coefficients
for the Routine and Manual measures. Both Routine measures are rela-
tively small in magnitude and not highly robust. We find a similar pattern
for the PDII and O*NET Manual task measure, with the PDII measure
taking a negative sign and the O*Net measure taking a positive sign. In
this case, the discrepancy in magnitudes is substantial, and the O*Net
Manual measure proves robustly significant. One summary conclusion we
draw from this exercise is that deriving comparable task measures from
different survey instruments presents a substantial challenge.
More encouraging from the table is the fact that the PDII person- and
occupation-level measures generally retain significance even conditional
on inclusion of the O*Net task measures. As the F-tests of joint signifi-
cance reported in the final rows of table 6 indicate, the PDII person-level
measures are highly significant in all models, as are theO*Net occupation-
level measures. The PDII occupation-level measures are also highly sig-
nificant in all but the final specification, where human capital and demo-
graphic variables are included in the model along with all three sets of task
measures.
One inference from this exercise is that mean PDII scores could po-
tentially be usefully merged onto other data sets that lack detailed in-
formation about the task content of jobs, such as the Current Population
Survey. But the results in tables 5 and 6 also underscore that this proce-
dure would discard meaningful variation in job tasks that occurs within
rather than between occupations. Indeed, the main takeaway of these wage
models is that, relative to standard, occupation-level measures of job tasks,
person-level task measures appear to add significant value in explaining
worker outcomes.
V. Job Tasks and Wages: Testing the Model’s Predictions
This section provides two exploratory tests of the primary implication
of the conceptual model following the simple theoretical ideas outlined in
Section I. The first implication that we test is that the returns to the task
categories must negatively covary within occupations.26 To implement
this test, we first estimate separately by occupation the following OLS
regression of workers’ hourly wages on their task inputs:
26 To simplify terminology but with no loss of generality, we also refer to an
occupation’s wage regression intercept as a “task return.”
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Human Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages S87As noted above, for an occupation to be included in this exercise, it must
contribute at least five wage observations to the PDII data set, yielding a
sample of 91 occupations and 928 observations.27
Using the parameters obtained from estimating equation ð12Þ, we per-
form bivariate regressions of the elements of faj; bj1; bj2; bj3g on one
another, in all cases weighting by the sum of worker weights within an
occupation:
b^j1 5 a1 1 g1b^j2 1 e12; b^j1 5 a2 1 g2b^j3 1 e13;
a^j 5 a3 1 g3b^j1 1 e01; a^j 5 a4 1 g4b^j2 1 e02; a^j 5 a5 1 g5b^j5 1 e03:
ð13Þ
The conceptual framework predicts that the point estimates for g1; : : : ; g5
will not be uniformly positive. More precisely, we expect that
minfg1; : : : ; g5g < 0.
Consistent with the model’s theoretical prediction, we find a nonzero
number of negative relationships among task returns within occupations
ðtable 7Þ. In general, occupations that have high returns to Abstract tasks
have low returns to Manual and Routine tasks. Conversely, returns to
Manual and Routine tasks are positively correlated across occupations.
Columns 4–6 in table 7 indicate that occupations with high returns to
Manual tasks have relatively low wage intercepts, whereas occupations
with high returns to Abstract and Routine tasks have higher intercepts as
well. Overall, of the six bivariate relationships in the table, three are
negative, and one of these is highly significant.
While these patterns are supportive of the model, the prediction that at
least one of the six coefficients in table 7 must be negative is minimally
restrictive.28 Indeed, half of the six coefficients in the table are positive, and
these coefficients display a similar pattern of statistical significance to the
three point estimates that are negative.
A second complementary implication of the Roy framework is that
workers will positively self-select into occupations along at least one task
27 There are four parameters to be estimated, and hence at least five observations
are required to estimate the parameters plus standard errors.
28 If the regression coefficients were drawn at random, and assuming that the
standard errors have the appropriate size, we would anticipate that one in 40
ð2.5%Þ point estimates would be negative and statistically significant at the 5%
level or better. With six coefficients drawn at random, the chance of obtaining at
least one negative and significant coefficient is equal to 14% ð12 0:9756Þ. Thus, in
the best case, our test would reject the null by chance in 15% of cases. One could
also note, for example, that half of the coefficients in the table are positive and that
these display a similar pattern of statistical significance to the negative point es-
timates. While this pattern is not at odds with the model, it underscores that the
model places very modest restrictions on the pattern of coefficients.
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dimension. To test this prediction, we estimate anOLSwagemodel akin to
equation ð10Þ from the theory section that interacts workers’ self-reported
Table 7
Bivariate Relationships among Regression Coefﬁcients obtained from
Occupation-Level Wage Regression Models: OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable
bðManualÞ
ð1Þ
bðAbstractÞ
ð2Þ
bðRoutineÞ
ð3Þ
Intercept
ð4Þ
Intercept
ð5Þ
Intercept
ð6Þ
bðAbstractÞ 2.10 .73
ð.09Þ ð.19Þ
bðRoutineÞ 2.16 .26
ð.10Þ ð.19Þ
bðManualÞ .31 2.72
ð.13Þ ð.24Þ
R-squared .01 .03 .05 .14 .02 .09
NOTE.—n 5 91. Each column in each panel corresponds to a separate OLS regression of the indicated
coefficient estimate on the tabulated coefficients plus a constant ðcoefficient not reportedÞ. Standard errors
are given in parentheses. Models are weighted by the sum of PDII sampling weights in each occupation.
Coefficients used as regressions variables above are obtained from person-level regressions of log hourly
wages on standardized PDII task input measures ðAbstract, Routine, and ManualÞ and an intercept,
where regressions are performed separately within each PDII occcupation that contains at least five
observations ð91 occupations totalÞ. Regressions are weighted by sum of PDII sampling weights in each
occupation. Means and SDs of the variables used in these models are: bðAbstractÞ .07 ð.47Þ; bðRoutineÞ
2.02 ð.51Þ; bðManualÞ 2.15 ð.39Þ; intercept 3.02 ð.93Þ.
S88 Autor/Handeluse of Abstract, Routine, and Manual tasks with the mean use of each task
within their occupations. We anticipate that at least one of these three
interaction terms will be significantly positive—and that more than one
will be positive if selection takes the form of comparative but not absolute
advantage.
The estimates in table 8 offer support for these predictions. Column 1,
which augments our prior OLS wage model with occupation-level task
means, indicates that wages are significantly higher in occupations that are
intensive in Abstract tasks and significantly lower in occupations that are
intensive in Routine tasks. When we add interactions between worker-
level and occupational-level mean task use in column 2, a surprising pat-
tern emerges: two of the three interaction terms ðRoutine  mean Rou-
tine, Manual  mean ManualÞ are positive, and the Routine interaction
term is highly significant.29 As indicated by the F-statistic at the bottom of
the table, these three interaction terms are also jointly significant. This is
particularly noteworthy given that the coefficients on both the worker
and occupation measures of Routine and Manual task inputs are negative,
likely reflecting the fact that Routine and Manual tasks are most prevalent
29 The table 8 estimates differ slightly from the specification in table 6 in that we
do not use “leave-out” means of occupation task measures in table 8. This has little
substantive effect on the estimates but it does contribute to a slight increase in
precision.
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in middle- and low-wage occupations. The pattern of results remains
unaffected by the progressive addition of demographic and human capital
Table 8
OLS Wage Regressions with Interactions between Worker Task Use Intensity
and Occupational Mean Task Use Intensity
ð1Þ ð2Þ ð3Þ ð4Þ ð5Þ ð6Þ
PDII Abstract ðperson levelÞ .07 .07 .08 .08 .06 .07
ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ
PDII Routine ðperson levelÞ 2.03 2.06 2.02 2.04 .00 2.02
ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ
PDII Manual ðperson levelÞ 2.15 2.14 2.14 2.13 2.09 2.09
ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.02Þ ð.03Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ
PDII Abstract ðocc meanÞ .18 .18 .14 .14 .10 .10
ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ
PDII Routine ðocc meanÞ 2.08 2.10 2.08 2.09 2.04 2.05
ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ
PDII Manual ðocc meanÞ 2.01 .02 2.03 2.01 2.01 .01
ð.03Þ ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.04Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ
PDII Abstract ðperson levelÞ  PDII
Abstract ðocc meanÞ 2.01 2.01 2.01
ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.02Þ
PDII Routine ðperson levelÞ  PDII
Routine ðocc meanÞ .06 .05 .032
ð.02Þ ð.02Þ ð.016Þ
PDII Manual ðperson levelÞ  PDII
Manual ðocc meanÞ .03 .01 .01
ð.03Þ ð.03Þ ð.03Þ
Gender and race controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Human capital controls No No No No Yes Yes
R-squared .35 .36 .38 .39 .47 .47
Fðinteraction termsÞ 3.0 3.4 1.4
p-value .03 .02 .24
NOTE.—n 5 1,333. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered on occupation ð241 categoriesÞ. All
models include a constant and are weighted by sampling weights. Gender and race controls are dummies
for female, black, Asian, and Hispanic. Human capital controls are education dummies, experience,
experience squared, and a Spanish-language dummy. occ 5 occupation.
Human Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages S89controls in columns 3–6, confirming their robustness. The Routine in-
teraction term remains negative and significant in all cases. These positive
interaction terms are potentially consistent with the Roy model’s impli-
cation that workers who are highly productive at a given set of tasks self-
select into occupations that differentially reward those tasks.30
30 In a separate analysis available from the authors, we replaced all of the PDII
occupational task means with the corresponding task scales from O*Net. In these
regression models, all three interactions between person-level task inputs and their
corresponding occupational means were positive and jointly significant ðalthough
significance declines once we include demographic and human capital controlsÞ.
Given the imperfect correspondence between the PDII and O*Net task measures,
we place less weight on this test of the Roy model than on the prior estimates in
table 8.
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VI. Conclusions
S90 Autor/HandelThis paper makes three contributions to the expanding empirical and
theoretical literature that employs job tasks as a building block for con-
ceptualizing and quantifying job skill demands. Drawing on original, rep-
resentative survey data containing detailed measures of workers’ job tasks,
we document that job tasks vary substantially within ðas well as betweenÞ
occupations and we establish that variation in job tasks among workers
in the same occupations is systematically related to their race, gender, and
English-language proficiency. The most pronounced and systematic dif-
ferences in job task activity are found for Spanish-language speakers, who
perform substantially fewer analytic and interpersonal tasks and substan-
tially more repetitive physical and cognitive tasks than equally educated
workers in the same occupations. Notably, females perform substantially
fewer analytic tasks and substantially more interpersonal and routine tasks
than equally educated males, but this pattern is proximately accounted for
by differences in the occupations inwhichmales and females are employed.
The second contribution of the paper is to explore the degree to which
person-level variation in job tasks is a robust predictor of wages. While it
would be hypothetically possible that the systematic differences in self-
reported job tasks that we find between demographic groups are primar-
ily an artifact of group differences in response patterns, the wage analysis
suggests that this is not the case. The tasks that workers perform on the job
are significant predictors of their hourly wages, both between and within
occupational, demographic, and education groups. Notably, worker-level
measures remain powerful predictors of wages when occupation-level job
task measures from both O*Net and the PDII survey are simultaneously
included in regression models. Thus, job task measures effectively dis-
tinguish normally unobserved attributes of workers and jobs that vary
within occupational, demographic, and education groups.
The third contribution of the paper is to offer a conceptual framework
that makes explicit the links between workers’ human capital endow-
ments, their occupation, the tasks that they perform on the job, and the
wages they earn. The simple observation that motivates our approach is
that, while workers can hold multiple jobs, they can supply tasks to only
one job at a time. The indivisible bundling of tasks within jobs means that
the productivity of particular task inputs will not necessarily be equated
across jobs—and so the “law of one price” will not generally apply to the
market rewards to job tasks.
We propose a high-dimensional Roy framework in which the allocation
of workers to tasks is driven by individuals self-selecting into occupations
to maximize their incomes given their skill endowments. While this con-
ceptual model is primarily intended to build intuition rather than guide
empirical analysis, our exploratory empirical analysis provides some initialThis content downloaded from 18.7.29.240 on Tue, 10 Mar 2015 13:28:11 PM
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support for the conceptual model. In particular, we find evidence that
ð1Þ task returns vary across occupations in a manner that is consistent with
Human Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages S91competitive equilibrium and ð2Þ worker self-selection into occupations
takes a form that is consistent with comparative advantage.31
This evidence also has two main limitations. The first, emphasized
above, is that these tests of the theory are not high powered. A second
limitation is perhaps more fundamental: even if the evidence above were
to constitute a definitive “existence proof” of self-selection in the labor
market, our bare-bonesmodel does not in its current form offer any deeper
insight into the nature of self-selection that is operative. A richer model
would potentially allow us to credibly characterize the variation in task
returns across sectors and to study in detail the allocation of workers to
tasks. This tool would be invaluable for forecasting how changes in task
prices—catalyzed, for example, by automation or offshoring—may re-
shape the occupational assignments and earnings of different skill and
demographic groups. We see a richer and more structured elaboration of
this simple task approach as a promising avenue for further research.
AppendixWe used multi-item, additive scales from the O*Net database version
14.0 that were constructed by Acemoglu and Autor ð2011Þ to evaluate the
convergent validity of the PDII items and to assess the relative merits of
person-level and occupation-level task measures. The names of the con-
structed scales are “Abstract,” “Routine,” and “Nonroutine Manual,” and
the O*Net items used in each are listed below.
1. Abstract
This scale is a standardized sum of the following two subscales:
A. Analytical
Analyzing data/information ðWork Activities questionnaire, no. 9Þ
Thinking creatively ðWork Activities questionnaire, no. 11Þ
Interpreting information for others ðWork Activities questionnaire,
no. 25Þ
B. Interpersonal
Establishing and maintaining personal relationships ðWork Activities
questionnaire, no. 28Þ31 More precisely, absolute advantage, which is a special case of comparative
advantage ðsee n. 15Þ.
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Guiding, directing, and motivating subordinates ðWork Activities ques-
tionnaire, no. 36Þ
S92 Autor/HandelCoaching and developing others ðWorkActivities questionnaire, no. 37Þ
2. Routine
This scale is a standardized sum of the following two subscales:
A. Cognitive
Importance of repeating the same tasks ðWork Context questionnaire,
no. 51Þ
Importance of being exact or accurate ðWork Context questionnaire,
no. 50Þ
Structured versus unstructured work ðreverseÞ ðWork Context ques-
tionnaire, no. 52Þ
B. Manual
Controlling machines and processes ðWork Activities questionnaire,
no. 18Þ
Keeping a pace set by machinery or equipment ðWork Context ques-
tionnaire, no. 55Þ
Time spent making repetitive motions ðWork Context questionnaire,
no. 42Þ
3. Nonroutine Manual
Operating vehicles, mechanized devices, or equipment ðWork Activi-
ties questionnaire, no. 20Þ
Time spent using hands to handle, control, or feel objects, tools, or
controls ðWork context questionnaire, no. 40Þ
Manual dexterity ðWork Abilities questionnaire, no. 23Þ
Spatial orientation ðWork Abilities questionnaire, no. 18ÞThis content downloaded from 18.7.29.240 on Tue, 10 Mar 2015 13:28:11 PM
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Table A1
Means of Demographic, Human Capital, Earnings, and Occupation Measures
Human Capital, Job Tasks, and Wages S93for the Main Sample
Mean SD
A. Demographics:
AgeThis content downloaded from 18.7.29.240 on Tue, 1
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and C39.370 Mar 2015 13:28:11 PM
onditions12.62
Female
Spanish speaker.47
.05
.50
.21White non-Hispanic .73 .45
Black non-Hispanic .10 .30
Asian .02 .14
Hispanic .16 .37B. Human capital and earnings:
Less than high school .09 .29
High school graduate .31 .46
Some college .25 .43
College or greater .34 .47
Spanish speaker .05 .21
Potential experience 19.57 12.36
Hourly wage 23.89 31.88
Log hourly wage 2.93 .66C. Major occupation:
Manager .11 .32
Professional .24 .42
Technical/sales .12 .33
Clerical .15 .35
Construction/repair .07 .26
Production .06 .23
Transportation .07 .26
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